Proposition 11: Whatever changes the power of activity in our body, the idea of it changes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.
Proof: This proposition is evident from 2.7. or from 2.14.
Note: Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.
These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
Pleasure signifies a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection.
The pleasure relative to both body and mind, I call:
This is the state when one part of human nature is more affected than the rest.
This is the state when all parts of human nature are affected.
Pain signifies a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection.
The pleasure relative to both body and mind, I call:
This is the state when one part of human nature is more affected than the rest.
This is the state when all parts of human nature are affected.
Beyond desire, pain, and pleasure, there is no other primary emotion.
All other emotions arise from these three.
To understand how one idea is contrary to another, I will explain Proposition 10 further
In the note to 2.17 we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the body's existence as longas the body exists.
It follows (Corollary to 2.8), that our mind's present existence depends solely on the mind involving the body's actual existence.
We showed (2.17, 2.18, and note) that the mind's power in imagining and remembering things, also depends on it involving the body's actual existence.
It follows, that the mind's present existence and its power of imagining are removed when the mind ceases to affirm the body's present existence.
The cause why the mind ceases to affirm the body's existence cannot be the mind itself (3. 4), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist.
For (by 2.6) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist.
Therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the body's existence, because the body ceases to exist.
But (2.17) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the body's present existence and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.
Proposition 12: As far as it can, the mind endeavours to conceive things which increases the power of activity in the body.
Proof: So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard that external body as present (2.17).
Consequently (2.7), so long as the human mind regards an external body as present, that is (2.17. note), conceives it, the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external body.
Thus, so long as the mind conceives things, which increase the power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of activity (3. Post. 1).
Consequently, (3.11) the mind's power of thinking is for that period increased.
Thus (3.6., 3.9) the mind endeavours to imagine such things. Q.E.D.
Love and Hate
Proposition 13: When the mind conceives things which change the body's power of activity, it endeavours to remember things which exclude those initial things.
Proof: The power of the mind and body is reduced whenever it conceives of things that reduces is power of activity (cf. 3. 12. Proof).
Nevertheless, the mind will continue to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes that previous thing (2.17).
That is, the power of the mind and of the body is reduced, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived.
Therefore, the mind (3.9), as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember things which do not reduce its power. Q.E.D.
Corollary: It follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving things, which reduce the power of itself and of the body.
Note: This explains the nature of Love and Hate.
Love is just pleasure with an external cause.
Hate is just pain with an external cause.
He who loves necessarily tries to have and keep to him, the object of his love.
While he who hates tries to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
Proposition 14: If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two, be also affected by the other.
Proof: If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will straightway remember the other also (2.18).
But the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies (2.16. Coroll. 2).
Therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind (3. Def. 3) has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.
Proposition 15: Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.
Proof: Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase or reduce the said power (3. Post. 1).
Whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (3.11. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.
Thus the former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.
In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire. Q.E.D.
Corollary: Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.
Proof: For from this fact alone it arises (3.14), that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (3.11 note), according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, etc.
Consequently (3.12), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (3.13 Coroll.), in other words (3.13. note), according as it may love or hate the same. Q.E.D.
Note: Hence we understand how we can love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us, merely from sympathy or antipathy.
We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way.
I will show this in the next Proposition.
I know that certain authors who first introduced the terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify some occult qualities in things.
Nevertheless, I think we can use those terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.
Proposition 16: If Object A resembles Object B that gives the mind pain or pleasure, we shall still love or hate Object A even if it did not cause us pain or pleasure.
Proof: The point of resemblance was in the object (by hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus (3.14), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point of resemblance, will be accidentally (3.15) a cause of pleasure or pain.
Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.
Proposition 17: If Object A gives us pain, but resembles Object B which gives us pleasure, we shall hate and love Object A at the same time.
Proof: The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause of pain, and (3.13. note), in so far as we imagine it with this emotion, we shall hate it.
Further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it (3.16).
Thus we shall both hate and love the same thing. Q.E.D.
Note: This disposition of the mind, which arises from two contrary emotions, is called vacillation.
It stands to the emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination (2.44. note).
Vacillation and doubt only differ from each other in intensity.
I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the other accidentally.
I have done this so that they might be more easily deduced from what went before.
Vacillation generally arises from an object causes both vacillation and doubt.
The human body is composed (2. Post. 1) of a variety of individual parts of different nature.
It may therefore (Ax. 1 after Lemma 3 after 2.13.) be affected in a variety of different ways by one and the same body.
On the contrary, as one and the same thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different ways affect one and the same part of the body.
Hence we can easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of many and conflicting emotions.
Proposition 18. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present.
Proof: So long as a man is affected by the image of anything, he will regard that thing as present, even though it be non—existent (2.17. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the image of time past or future (2.44. note).
Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether it be referred to time past, time future, or time present.
That is (2.16. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or present.
Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same, whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.
Note 1: I call a thing past or future, as we either have been or shall be affected by it.
For instance, according as:
we have seen it,
we are about to see it,
it has recreated us,
it will recreate us,
it has harmed us, or
it will harm us.
We affirm a thing's existence as we thus conceive it.
That is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the thing's existence.
Therefore (2.17.) the body is affected by the thing's image in the same way as if the thing were actually present.
However, those who have had many experiences generally vacillate when they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (2.44 note).
It follows that the emotions arising from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until people become assured of the issue.
Note 2: We can thus understand what is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and Disappointment.
Hope is just an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, of which we do not yet know the issue.
On the other hand, fear is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something that we doubt.
If the element of doubt is removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear becomes Despair.
In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past of which we have doubted the issue.
Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy.
 Conscientiæ morsus—thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
Proposition 19: He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain.
If he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.
Proof: As far as possible, the mind endeavours to conceive those things which increase or help the body's power of activity (3.12.).
In other words (3.12. note), those things which it loves.
But conception is helped by those things which postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered by those which exclude the existence of a thing (2.17).
Therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the object of love, in other words (3.11. note), affect the mind pleasurably.
On the contrary, those things which exclude the existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental endeavour.
In other words, affect the mind painfully.
He, therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain, etc. Q.E.D.
Proposition 20: He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure.
Proof: The mind (3.13.) endeavours to conceive those things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (3.13. note).
It endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the existence of what it hates.
Therefore the image of a thing, which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid mental effort.
In other words (3.11. note), affects the mind pleasurably.
Thus, he who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.
Proposition 21: He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully.
The one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.
Proof: The images of things (as we showed in 3.19) which postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the said object.
But pleasure postulates the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is (3.11. note) a transition to a greater perfection.
Therefore, the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental endeavour of the lover.
That is, it affects the lover pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion may have been greater in the object of love.
This was our first point.
Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount of pain (3.11. note).
Therefore (3.19.) he who conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully, will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.
Proposition 22: If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing.
Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.
Proof: He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully—that is, if we conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or pain (3.21).
But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore (III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.
Note: Prop. 21 explains to us the nature of Pity, which we may define as pain arising from another's hurt.
What term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.
We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on another, Approval;
The hatred towards him who injures another, we will call Indignation.
We must further remark, that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown in 3. 21), but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves (as I will show presently).
Thus, we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves.
Contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.
Proposition 23: He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure.
Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel pain.
Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.
Proof: In so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the strength of the pain (3.11. note).
Therefore, he (3.20.) who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.
This was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of the pleasurably affected thing (3.11. note), in proportion as the pleasure is greater or less.
If anyone imagines that an object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception (3.13.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other words (3.11. note), he who hates will be painfully affected. Q.E.D.
Note: This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and without any mental conflict.
For (as I am about to show in Prop. 27.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances.
But here we are regarding hatred only.
Proposition 24: If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall feel love towards him.
Proof: This proposition is proved in the same way as III. xxii., which see.
Note: These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.
Proposition 25: We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.
On the contrary, we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.
Proof: That, which we conceive to affect an object of our love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or painfully (3.21.).
But the mind (3.12.) endeavours, as far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us pleasurably; in other words (2.17. and Coroll.), it endeavours to regard them as present.
And, contrariwise (3.13.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as affect us painfully;
Therefore, we endeavour to affirm concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably. Q.E.D.
Proposition 26: We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully.
Contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.
Proof: This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the foregoing proposition followed from 3.21. Note: Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.
Pride is a feeling of a person who thinks too highly of himself.
It is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception.
He sees his accomplishments as real.
He exults in them as long as he:
is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and
determines his own power of action.
Therefore, pride is pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself.
The pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called over-esteem.
Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man is called disdain
Proposition 27: If we conceive a thing which is like ourselves, which we have not assigned any emotion to, and that thing gets an emotion from us, we will be affected with the same emotion
Proof: The images of things are modifications of the human body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us (2.17).
In other words (2.10.), whereof the ideas involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of the external bodies as present.
If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the idea which we form of the external body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modification of the external body.
Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.
If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not similar, emotion. Q.E.D.
Note 1: This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called compassion (cf. 3.22. note);
When it is referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire.
Corollary 1: If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.
Proof: This is proved from the last proposition in the same manner as 3.22. is proved from 3.21.
Corollary 2: We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because its misery affects us painfully.
Proof: If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.
Corollary 3: We seek to free from misery, as far as we can, a thing which we pity.
Proof: That, which painfully affects the object of our pity, affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition).
Therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. 3.13.).
In other words (3.9. note), we shall:
want to destroy it, or
be determined for its destruction.
Thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.
Note 2: This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from compassion.
Concerning love or hate towards him who has done good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like ourselves, see 3.22. note.
Proposition 28: We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure.
But we endeavour to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.
Proof: We endeavour to conceive that which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (3.12.).
In other words (2.17.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as present or actually existing.
But the endeavour of the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power of action.
(This is clear from 2.7. Coroll. and 2.11. Coroll.).
Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its existence, in other words (which by 3.9. note, come to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.
Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed to be the cause of pain, that is (3.13. note), which we hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (3.20.).
We shall, therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy the same, or (3.13.) to remove it from us, so that we may not regard it as present.
This was our second point. Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.
Proposition 29: We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.
 By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.
Proof: From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (3.27.).
That is (3.13. note), from this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.
And so we shall endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.
Note: This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt.
In other cases it is generally called kindliness.
Furthermore, I give the name of praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.
Proposition 30: If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.
In other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.
On the other hand, if he has done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.
Proof: He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or pain (3.27).
But, as a man (2.19 and 2.23) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.
In other words, he will regard himself with pleasure.
And so mutatis mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.
Note: Love (3.13) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
Hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
The pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred.
But 'love' and 'hatred' refer to external objects.
We will use other names for the emotions now under discussion.
Pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will call Honour.
The emotion contrary to honour we will call Shame.
I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed.
Otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called self-complacency.
Its contrary pain is called repentance.
It may happen (2.17 Coroll.) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (3.25) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure.
It may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.
 So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read, "an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria.
 See previous endnote.
Proposition 31. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc.
On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.
Proof: From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves anything we shall ourselves love that thing (3.27).
But we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.
Again, from the mere fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall ourselves shrink from that thing (3.27).
If we assume that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously love it and shrink from it.
In other words, we shall be subject to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.
Corollary: From the foregoing, and also from 3.28 it follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as the poet says: "As lovers let us share every hope and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the other leaves."
 Ovid, "Amores," 2.19. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.
"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat." Note: This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition (see 3.29 note).
Wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.
Proposition 32: If a person takes a delight in something that we also want, but which only one of us can have, we shall try to make that person not have it.
Proof: We see a person taking delight in a thing (3.27 and Coroll.) which we ourselves love.
If our pleasure would be prevented by another person's delight in the object, we shall try to prevent his possession of it (3.28). Q.E.D.
Note: Human nature makes us:
pity on those who fare ill, and
envy those who fare well with hatred proportional to his own love for the goods in their possession.
The same property of human nature that makes men merciful, also makes men envious and ambitious.
This is more obvious during our early years.
Children, whose body is continually in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying.
In as much as images of things are modifications of the human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner, they desire to:
imitate whatever they see others doing, and
possess whatever they conceive as delighting others.
Proposition 33: When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.
Proof: That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to conceive in preference to anything else (3.12).
If the thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in preference to anything else (3.29).
In other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (3.13 note), that it should love us in return. Q.E.D.
Proposition 34. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency.
Proof: We endeavour (3.33), as far as we can, to bring about, that what we love should love us in return:
In other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.
Therefore, in proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.
That is (3.11 and note) the greater will be our pleasure.
But when we take pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (3.30).
Therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected, etc. Q.E.D.
Proposition 35. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival.
Proof: In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is well affected towards him, will be the strength of his self-approval (by the last Prop.), that is (3.30 note), of his pleasure.
He will, therefore (3.28), endeavour, as far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound to him.
This endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks that someone else has a similar desire (3.31).
But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved object has joined to itself.
Therefore (3.11 note) he will for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his rival;
That is, he will be (3.13) affected with hatred towards the loved object and also towards his rival (3.15 Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved object. Q.E.D.
Note: This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object;
and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates:
and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates.
This condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman:
For he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.
We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him pain as a lover, as I will now show.
Proposition 36: He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.
Proof: Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure (3.15).
He will, therefore, desire to possess it, in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.
Corollary: A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.
Proof: For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.
As he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives it to be missing, feel pain (3.19). Q.E.D.
Note: This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence of the object of love, is called Regret.
Proposition 37. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
Proof: Pain reduces a man's power of activity (3.11 note).
(3.7) It reduces the effort with which he endeavours to persist in his own being.
Therefore (3.5.) it is contrary to the said endeavour.
Thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are directed to removing that pain.
But (by the definition of pain), in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity.
Therefore the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed to remove it.
That is, the greater will be the desire or appetite in endeavouring to remove it.
Again, since pleasure (3.11 note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.
Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.
Proposition 38: If a man has begun to hate an object that he used to love so much that it totally destroys that love, he will hate it as much as he had loved it in the past.
Proof: If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it.
Love is a pleasure (3.13 note) which a man tries to render permanent (3.28).
He does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by affecting it as far as he can pleasurably.
This endeavour is greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his affection (3.33).
Now these endeavours are constrained by hatred towards the object of love (3.13 Coroll. and 3.23).
Wherefore the lover (3.11 note) will for this cause also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love has been greater.
That is, in addition to the pain caused by hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object.
Wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former love was greater. Q.E.D.